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Capital Punishment Reconsidered
By WLIAM 0. RECHERT*
I
Among the many bills which failed to pass the last session of
the General Assembly was one (House Bill No. 229) which called
for the abolition of capital punishment in the State of Kentucky.-
Although the bill received relatively little attention in the press,
and was not enacted into law by the legislature, an unusually
large number of citizens expressed hostility to the proposal
through letters to their newspapers. It is not at all surprising
that the public-or at least that part of it which made itself heard
-should react unfavorably to the idea that capital punishment
be abolished. Opinion polls taken in other states and countries
that have sought to implement this reform consistently indicate
that the general public in most communities holds a persistent
fear that discarding the death penalty will lead to a phenomenal
increase of disorder and violence and is thus opposed to any
movement toward abolition. The expressed fears of the public,
however, are not always synonymous with the advanced social
and political attitudes of a society. This is demonstrated by the
fact that the long-range legislative trend everywhere has been
in the direction of abandoning capital punishment. It is to be
expected, therefore, that the Kentucky General Assembly will
again have to debate the question of whether the death penalty
shall be continued in force for the six crimes which at present
are punishable by death in this state. This essay is devoted to a
consideration of some of the problems such a discussion will
entail.
Much of the confusion surrounding the question of capital
punishment stems from the circumstance that the average citizen
rarely has occasion to fully inform himself as to the actual facts
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Kentucky.
'The bill was introduced by Representative Vernor 0. Cottongim. Although
it was successfully reported out of the Committee of Ways and Means, it did not
come before the House for its final reading.
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involved in the issue. The popular notion that the penalty of
death is the most efficient, if not the only, means of deterring
murder has become so deeply embedded in the folklore of Ameri-
can society that it is rarely evaluated as to its basic validity.
Nor is this altogether peculiar to the United States, as witnessed
by the fact that a heated controversy developed in Britain when
it was recently proposed in Parliament that hanging should no
longer be employed as a punishment for murder. One of the
major reasons why this notion has for so long gone unchallenged
is the widely held belief that those who favor the abolition of
capital punishment have allowed their emotions to dominate
their reason. Those who support the retention of capital punish-
ment have thus been successful in defending their viewpoint as
"realistic," as opposed to the "idealistic" but "impractical" label
which has been attached to the abolitionists. A careful analysis
of the facts surrounding the controversy reveals, however, that
it is not true that those who would do away with the death
penalty are less reasonable in their argument than their oppon-
ents. If we may rely on the testimony of Sir Ernest Gowers,
chairman of the 1949 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment
in Britain, it is actually not the abolitionists but the defenders
of the death penalty who have allowed emotion to sway their
reason.2 This conclusion is substantiated by the viewpoint of
those sociologists who maintain that "not a single assumption
underlying the theory of capital punishment can be squared with
the facts of human nature" as modern scientific thought con-
ceives these facts to be.3
In an effort to clear away some of the confusion that sur-
rounds the question of capital punishment, this essay will con-
sider the death penalty in terms of its broad social and political
effects. It is the writer's sincere conviction that no intelligent
evaluation of capital punishment can be made so long as we
continue to think of the death penalty as being unrelated to the
system of values we as a society have created for ourselves.
Law, on this view, is not something that is complete in itself;
it is, rather, an integral part of our total social and political
2 Sir Ernest Gowers, A Life for a Life?: The Problem of Capital Punish-
ment 8 (1956).
3 See Harry Elmer Barnes & Negley K. Teeters, New Horizons in Crimin-
ology, 850 (1955).
[Vol. 47,
CAPrrAL PuNImvE RECONSiFDHED
experience. From time to time we must examine its various
parts in order to determine whether they correlate with our new-
est insights into human values. When we find that any part of the
law fails to reflect the spirit of our moral values, which is the
most precious thing we as a society possess, we must do all that
we can to correct the deficiency. It would be highly imprudent
in this regard were we to substitute too hastily the untried
theories of the social sciences for the tested wisdom which is
embodied in the law.4 Yet we must also keep clearly in mind
that there is nothing sacred about the law that should cause
us to bow down before it in unquestioning obedience to its will.5
Capital punishment, if it is to be defended successfully,
must be proven to be adequate in two particulars. Not only
must it be shown that the immediate and practical effect of the
death penalty is to deter the murderer from committing an iso-
lated act of violence but it must also be demonstrated that its
long-range effect is to reduce the total quantity of violence
within society. This essay will consider each of these proposi-
tions in turn.
II
No responsible person in this country any longer urges the
retention of the death penalty solely on the argument that the
murderer should be made to suffer as retribution for his criminal
act. The idea of inflicting physical pain upon an individual as
just punishment for committing a crime against society has be-
come morally repulsive to us. Capital punishment, therefore,
must be justified on some grounds other than vindication. The
major argument thus advanced by those who favor the retention
of capital punishment is usually stated in utilitarian terms. Were
the death penalty to be abandoned as a deterrent to murder and
other heinous crimes, it is argued, the incidence of murder and
other forms of violence would in all probability become so great
that the state would be unable to provide the basic order that
is essential for a well-functioning society. This argument cannot
lightly be set aside. The quest for order is a primary function
of every society, for no society can hope to achieve continuity
4 erome Hall, Review of "Social Meaning of Legal Concepts-Criminal
Guilt,' 26 Ind. L. J. 150, 152 (1950).
5 Margaret Wilson, The Crime of Punishment 15-16 (1934).
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unless it perfects effective techniques for controlling the destruc-
tive forces it finds within itself. But it does not necessarily fol-
low, as many defenders of capital punishment seem to believe,
that the abolition of the death penalty must inevitably cause
society to revert to the chaos and brutality of the Hobbesian
state of nature.
Were the death penalty an effective means of deterring
murder, an analysis of the criminal statistics of the United States
could be expected to conclusively demonstrate the validity of
this proposition. A recent study of the subject makes clear, how-
ever, that there is no necessary correlation between the presence
or absence of the death penalty and the murder rate in any
particular state.6 Maine, which abolished capital punishment
in 1870, has the lowest murder rate of any state in the union.
Wisconsin and Minnesota, which abandoned the death penalty
in 1854 and 1911, respectively, have far lower homicide rates
than most of the other states. Michigan, Rhode Island, and
North Dakota, which have also abolished capital punishment,
have somewhat higher murder rates than Wisconsin and Minne-
sota. A comparison of the criminal statistics of these states and
those of the states which lie adjacent to them reveals, however,
that murder is not more frequently committed in the states
that have given up capital punishment than in those that have
retained it.7 It is highly significant, on the other hand, that
Georgia, the state that executes more persons annually than any
other, also has the highest murder rate.
Due to social and cultural differences which exist between
the American experience and that of other nations in Europe
and Asia, it is impossible to make any exact comparison between
one country and another. It is interesting to note, nevertheless,
that the British Select Committee on Capital Punishment heard
evidence in 1930 which indicated that in no country that has
abolished capital punishment has there been an increase in the
murder rate." Many countries, as well as states, have reintro-
duced the death penalty some years after it was abolished. But
it appears that this action has been taken more for hysterical
6 George B. Vold, "The Extent and Trend of Capital Crimes in the United
States," 284 Annals 4, (1952).
7 Fred J. Cook, "Capital Punishment; Does it Prevent Crime?", 182 Nation
195-6 (1956).
8 E. Roy Calvert, The Death Penalty Enquiry 109 (1931).
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than for scientific reasons. Having allowed the death penalty
to fall into disuse in 1936, as an example, New Zealand reintro-
duced it in 1950 after two bloody murders had outraged public
opinion. Yet the murder rate in New Zealand was lower in the
fifteen year period during which capital punishment had been
suspended than in the fifteen year period which immediately
preceded its suspension.9 Although these fragmentary statistics
do not prove that capital punishment is entirely without power
to deter murder, they do indicate that the abolition of the death
penalty does not inevitably lead to social chaos.
If society is to continue to defend capital punishment on the
grounds that it is a successful means of deterring violence within
the social order, we must clearly demonstrate that the threat of
death does in fact deter would-be murderers from carrying out
their violent impulses. But the utilitarian argument in support of
capital punishment, when viewed in terms of its psychological
effect upon the potential murderer, is seen to be almost entirely
without validity.10 Were human beings mechanical creatures
whose actions are rigidly determined according to felt sensations
of pain and pleasure, it would follow that no man would commit
murder when the certain penalty for his act would be death.
But the mechanical theory of human nature that serves as the
foundation of the utilitarian theory is no longer acceptable to
the social scientist. No doubt men do attempt to regulate their
actions as best they can according to what they think will bring
them happiness and avoid pain. But human existence is much
too complex in nature to permit men any exact knowledge of
where happiness actually lies, or what kind of action will ulti-
mately lead to the greatest amount of unhappiness. The vast
majority of murders, moreover, are not committed by normal
persons but by socially maladjusted individuals who are in-
capable of grasping the logic of cause and effect which is em-
bodied in the theory of capital punishment.:" It might well be
argued, in fact, that all murderers are affiliated with insanity in
one form or another, for "a normal person in a normal state
of mind just doesn't commit murder."'2 The difficulty here is
9 "The Abolition of Capital Punishment," 32 Can. B. Rev. 485, 487 (1954).
30 See E. Roy Calvert, Capital Punishment in the Twentieth Century (1927).
11 Herbert L. A. Hart, "Murder and the Principles of Punishment: England
and the United States," 52 Nw. U. L. Rev. 459 (1957).
12 Arthur Koestler, Reflections on Hanging 149 (1957). See also John Biggs
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that psychiatry has not yet developed an adequate definition
of insanity, or at least one that is uniformly acceptable in the
courts . 3
Those who argue for the retention of the death penalty on
the grounds that it is a practical means of maintaining order
within society tend to overlook the fact that most murders
are crimes of passion. As the name implies, the crime of passion
is one which involves strong human emotions which have gotten
out of control. Man, of course, is largely a creature of emotions,
and it is just these forces that under normal circumstances
furnish motivation for his actions. But man is also a reasonable
creature, in the sense that his upbringing and education pro-
vide him with a set of values which give meaning and direction
to his emotions. The individual whom we describe as normal,
while potentially capable of murder, never seriously contemplates
such an act because it is wholly alien to his moral character.
The murderer who kills while under the influence of an abnormal
sexual urge or in a moment of passionate hate, on the other hand,
has obviously allowed his emotions to momentarily dominate
his reason. If the moral teachings of his family, church, and
community, to which he has been exposed since infancy, were
so poorly learned that he was unable to keep himself from com-
mitting the most repulsive of all anti-social behavior, what hope
is there that a remote threat of punishment, stated in abstract
terms, will help him to maintain control of himself at the moment
that highly irrational forces in his subconscious surge forward
to overpower his reason?
We must realize in this connection that the popular notion
that man is an absolutely free moral agent is largely without
factual basis. It is true, of course, that in most ordinary social
situations the average individual is generally able to determine
for himself how he will behave, and to this extent it is correct
to say that he possesses free will. Yet it is equally true that in
many situations the course of action a given individual will fol-
low may greatly be determined by factors that are altogether
Jr., The Guilty Mind: Psychiatry and the Law of Homicide (1955); Henry
Weihofen, The Urge to Punish: New Approaches to the Problem of Mental
Irresponsibility for Crime (1956). [Hereinafter cited as Weihofen].
13See Roy Moreland, "Mental Responsibility and the Criminal Law-A
Defense,' 45 Ky. L. J. 215 (1956-57).
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beyond his control. Being a creature of habit and routine, the
average man is apt to give the appearance of being a very simple
organism. Yet as the psychologist, the biographer, and the
novelist have shown, the main part of human nature lies be-
neath the surface of appearance. All too often we lose sight
of the fact that every individual has a personality that has been
conditioned by inherited biological characteristics as well as a
myriad of daily events and tensions experienced since infancy.
We can no more explain the conduct of the individual without
reference to his past than we can understand a nation or civiliza-
tion that has been detached from its history. Although the
individual appears to be absolutely free to choose what he will
do in any given situation, his choice is always restricted by the
entire past his personality has been conditioned by. It is a gross
over-simplification of the problem to argue that the man who
commits murder in the heat of passion has deliberately chosen
to do the bad rather than the good. In point of fact, it might
virtually have been impossible for him not to commit murder in
the particular situation he found himself in. It requires very little
effort upon the part of the normal individual to live his life in
an orderly and peaceful manner. The same thing cannot be
said for the unfortunate individual whose heredity and early
environment are so seriously defective that he develops a wholly
abnormal personality. Such a person may be tormented by so
powerful a psychological tendency toward violence that the
amount of will power required to refrain from murder in his
particular case may well be beyond the level of human cap-
ability.
14
It is frightening to admit that there are some individuals in
society who are incapable of controlling themselves at certain
times and are virtually compelled to commit murder. The re-
tention of capital punishment, however, is not an intelligent
answer to this problem. Murder is a social phenomenon which
can never be brought under control until we approach it in a
scientific manner. But until the death penalty is abolished we
can not get to the important task of finding adequate techniques
for the social control of the abnormal individual who might be
inclined toward violence. As matters now stand, we spend
14 Calvert, Capital Punishment in the Twentieth Century 153 (1927).
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an enormous amount of money and energy in maintaining a
penal system that is in large measure devoted to the punishment
of the convicted murderer. There is much truth in the statement
that the legal profession has devoted more time and energy to
the task of finding ways to punish the human race than it has to
developing techniques for its improvement. 5 Yet criminologists
generally agree that the number of murderers, other than the
insane, who ever commit a second murder is negligible. Ac-
tually our fear of the potential murderer is greatly out of propor-
tion to the seriousness of the problem. This is not to minimize
the fact that there is on the average over 7,000 cases of murder
and non-negligent manslaughter committed each year in the
United States. Yet the popular notion that we must retain the
death penalty as a defense against the insane murderer who
suddenly strikes down the innocent bystander is wholly un-
reasonable. In point of fact very few people suddenly go beserk
and do bodily harm to the perfect stranger.' Most murders are
committed on the spur of the moment and are not in the least
premeditated.' 7 There is in almost every case of murder, how-
ever, a long history of grievance or antagonism between the
murderer and his victim who is most often a friend, relative, or
close acquaintance. A man may well strike down his wife or
girl friend in a fit of uncontrollable rage. But a strange woman
would have nothing to fear from this same man, for there would
be no motive or cause for violence in the latter case. It can not
be too strongly emphasized that the death penalty is wholly
useless as a deterrent to violence in either of these two situations.
Turning to the professional criminal, it is apparent that the
death penalty is equally impotent in persuading him to refrain
from murder. The theory of capital punishment is based on the
supposition that the criminal will pause to reflect on the painful
consequences he will suffer if he commits murder. But rational
reflection plays little part in the life of the criminal, and this
is particularly true at the moment he is actually engaged in
carrying out a crime. The business of the professional criminal
'5 Biggs, op cit. supra note 12, at XI.
16 Bernard A. Cruvant & Francis N. Waldrop, "The Murderer in the Mental
Institution," 284 Annals 43 (1952).
17 A recent study of 2,700 cases of murder and non-negligent manslaughtr
revealed that in only 37 of them was there clear intent or material motive for the
crime. Hall & Glueck, Cases On Criminal Law and Its Enforcement 86 (1958).
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is a hazardous occupation. It is foolish to suppose that a re-
mote fear of future death at the hands of the state will be more
meaningful to him than the immediate fear which dominates
his attention as he actually faces his victim or enemy.18 Most
men, however educated and enlightened they may be, are prone to
live in the present and take little heed of the future. If this is so
for the average individual, it is particularly true of the criminal
whose moral sensibilities have been warped and twisted by a
defective inheritance and environment.19 The very act of choos-
ing a life of crime rather than a socially acceptable means of
making a livelihood testifies to the fact that the professional crim-
inal is incapable of seeing what is actually to his greatest self-
interest.
Much of the responsibility for the fact that the professional
criminal does not take the death penalty seriously ultimately
rests upon society itself. It is well-known that it is not the
severity of the penalty that deters crime but the consistency
with which the penalty is applied. Just as the small child does
not fear threats of punishment if he is seldom punished, so the
professional criminal has learned that is is unlikely that he will
suffer the pain of death if he commits murder. Out of an esti-
mated 23,370 cases of murder, non-negligent manslaughter, and
rape in the year 1949, there were only 119 executions carried
out in the entire United States.2" Wide differences in the methods
employed for reporting criminal statistics make it extremely
difficult to compare Kentucky's rate of execution with that of
other states. But one conclusion may safely be drawn; the
potential murderer in Kentucky has little more to fear than
potential murderers do in other parts of the country. In the fiscal
years 1955 to 1957 there were a total of 369 cases of murder,
voluntary manslaughter, and rape received by state penal in-
stitutions in Kentucky, whereas there were only six executions
carried out during this same period.2' Obviously the statistical
probability of suffering the death penalty is so low under these
Is Karl F. Schnessler, "The Deterrent Influence of the Death Penalty," 284
Annals 61 (1952).
19Robert G. Caldwell, "Why is the Death Penalty Retained?" 284 Annals
51 (1952).
20 Id. at 50.
2IThese figures were supplied by the Division of Corrections of the Ken-
tucky Department of Welfare.
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circumstances that only the most timid murderer has any reason
to fear for his life. To retain capital punishment in the face
of this fact is an absurdity of the highest magnitude.
The utilitarian idea that capital punishment is an effective
and practical deterrent to crime fails to achieve credulity be-
cause of the outmoded and inadequate theory of human nature
upon which it is based. Those who argue for the retention of the
death penalty assume that man's basic nature is such that he
may readily be compelled to be peaceful and law-abiding through
punishment and threats of punishment. Yet almost 200 years
ago the Italian reformer Beccaria pointed out that punishment
can never be an effective deterrent to crime of any type because
human beings naturally develop a mental immunity to the threats
which must accompany it. England in the nineteenth century
adopted its famous "Bloody Code" according to the terms of
which over two-hundred crimes, including picking pockets, shop-
lifting, poaching, stealing turnips, and associating with gypsies,
became punishable by death. These executions, which were
carried out in public at periodic intervals, soon became festive
occasions. Enormous crowds attended them, causing the author-
ities much concern as a result of their boisterous conduct. Iron-
ically, public executions had to be discontinued after a time
because pick pockets were drawn to them in such large num-
bers that the purses of those in the crowd were not safe. Eng-
land today has a very enviable record so far as public order is
concerned. The police in its largest city, who do not ordinarily
carry guns, have not become targets as many people at first
feared they would. In 1950 there were only 122 murders reported
throughout the whole of England, most of which were com-
mitted by persons who were proven to be mentally deranged.
If there is any lesson to be learned from this it is that human
beings cannot be intimidated into being "good."
III
Probably the most meaningful criticism to be made of capital
punishment is that its actual effect upon society is likely to be
exactly the reverse of what its proponents claim for it. Many
responsible and serious persons who defend the death penalty
do so on the assumption that without its continued use, society
[Vol. 47,
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is apt to see the forces of law and order break down, with the
result that the very existence of civilization would be placed in
jeopardy. It has already been shown, however, that the claims
made for capital punishment as a practical deterrent to murder
are much exaggerated, if not altogether without reasonable
basis. We may go further than this and argue that capital pun-
ishment, rather than reducing the total level of violence within
society, may actually lead to its increase.
One -of the major functions of law-perhaps its highest func-
tion-is the difficult task of keeping the forces of hate and vin-
dictiveness which are bound to arise among any large group of
people under control.22 This is not to suggest that the state has
any responsibility for teaching morality to its citizens. Distin-
guishing the concept of state from that of society, we recognize
that each of these entities has distinct functions and purposes.
Society is the larger entity within which the individual finds
freedom for the development of his own private moral and social
satisfactions. The state, on the other hand, is theoretically
subordinate to society and has the limited function of maintain-
ing a legal order which is meant to serve the interests of all the
individual persons and groups who collectively comprise society.
23
It is no longer possible to hold, however, as Herbert Spencer
and other early liberals did, that the state has no other function
than the negative one of maintaining a bare legal order that has
no relevance whatever to morality. It is true, of course, that
the state has no right to directly teach morality. This is the
province of the church, the family, and other spontaneous as-
sociations within society that are qualified to carry out this
highly important function. But we now acknowledge the fact
that the law, while it is theoretically neutral in regard to ethical
matters, does have the practical effect of setting a moral example
for those who are regulated by it.
This is the reasoning behind the assertion that capital punish-
ment may actually increase the level of violence within society
rather than diminish it. The state, when it carries out the execu-
tion of one of its members, unconsciously develops attitudes in
the minds of the remainder of its citizens which may have dire
22 Weihofen, 140.
23See Ernest Barker, Principles of Social and Political Theory (1951);
B. M. Maclver, The Modem State (1926).
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social consequences. Just as the citizen-soldier loses his horror
of killing in time of war because he is rewarded for doing it, so
the average citizen is apt to be made brutal by the example set
for him by the state when it takes life. As Weihofen puts it:
"Official killing by the state makes killing respectable. It not
merely dulls the sensibilities of people to cruelty and inhumanity
but actually stimulates cruelty."24 Civilization, as Victor Gollancz
points out, cannot be preserved by conduct which is in itself
barbaric. 5 Capital punishment, on this view, is itself an act of
violence. Never having personally witnessed an execution, most
of us are not fully aware of how brutal and out of keeping with
our moral ideals an execution is. Those who have studied the
subject, however, report that the typical condemned prisoner
suffers a thousand deaths before his life is finally snuffed out.
We may argue in return, of course, that a murderer deserves to
suffer, just as the victim he killed was made to suffer. To argue
in this way, however, is to confuse the idea of justice with the
spirit of revenge; it is tacit admission that we actually enjoy
the thought of another human being made to suffer.
Most of us, of course, are quick to deny that we derive any
sadistic enjoyment from the execution of a criminal. Unfortun-
ately, however, we are not always aware of the unconscious
motives which help to determine our actions. Were we com-
pletely rational in regard to the criminal, we would experience
no emotional involvement whatever when we consider his fate.
But who in good conscience can claim that he has always been
calm and detached upon hearing of some particularly gruesome
crime? Most of us realize full well, when we are honest enough
to admit it, that there is something in ourselves which is akin
to that which is in the criminal. The average person, in the
very act of attempting to live up to the letter of the civil law,
not to mention his own personal moral code, is compelled to
repress a host of natural instincts within himself which make
him into a human being. Modern psychiatry suggests that most
individuals at one point or another in their lives develop guilt
feelings as a result of this repression. The criminal who goes
to his death in the execution chamber, on this view, serves as
the means by which the rest of us are able to vicariously purge
2 4 Weihofen, 168.
25 Capital Punishment: The Heart of the Matter 8 (1955).
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our own personalities of burdensome feelings of guilt.26 This is
particularly true in the case of the criminal who has been con-
victed of rape. All of us know how powerful a force the sexual
urge is within ourselves. The normal individual takes personal
pride in the fact that he is able to keep his sexual desires under
control. This seems to make us all the more vindictive toward
the individual who lacks the inner strength to emulate our good
example. The zealous way in which we punish the sex offender
is stark testimony to the fact that we are ourselves fearful that
we might sometime engage in the same kind of anti-social be-
havior.1
7
Being a relatively new branch of science, psychiatry is not
yet sufficiently accepted by the general public to permit any
thoroughgoing revision of the law in conformity with its findings.
The above argument against capital punishment is thus apt to
be rejected offhand by the majority of persons as being out of
touch with reality. But as Plato argued in his Republic, the ideas
the majority of us accept as valid may only be shadows of the
truth. It is painful to admit that we as a society actually enjoy
inflicting pain upon criminals for the personal satisfaction it
affords our egos.28 Yet if this is not so, why do we continue to
subject the condemned prisoner to a torture which is as mentally
painful as being broken on the wheel was physically painful?
Were we as charitable as Socrate's executioners, we might per-
mit the condemned prisoner to end his own life by taking poison
in the seclusion of his cell. Not only is this method less physically
painful than other forms of execution we presently employ but
it would permit him to retain a semblance of his human dignity
to the last possible moment.29 Instead of choosing this more
humane method of execution, we force the individual condemned
to death to submit to a number of indecencies before we permit
death to ease his suffering. Just as the mythical Tantalos was
condemned to stand in a pool of water that ever receded from
his thirsty lips, so we condemn the prisoner to what may prove
26 Arnold T. Lieberman and Dawn B. Girard, "Punishment: The Reward For
Guilt," 5 Buffalo L. Rev. 307 (1956).
27 Weihofen, 28.
28 For a very forceful presentation of this viewpoint, see Wilson, op. cit.
supra note 5.
29 According to one study, electrocution, which is the prescribed method of
execution in the state of Kentucky, is not, as is generally thought, entirely free of
physical pain. See Barnes and Teethers, op. cit. supra note 3, at 350.
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to be several years of anxious waiting in death row, only to learn
in the end that he must die after all. If he is to be electrocuted,
he must submit to having his ankles, wrists, and head shaved.
Then, having finished his last meal on earth, he must walk under
his own power to the execution chamber where he will at last
come face to face with his maker. All too often the condemned
prisoner is unable to walk to the place of execution, with the
awkward result that he must be carried there by the prison
officials while a chaplain walks nearby in hope that he may be
of some consolation at some point in the proceedings.
If we were certain that only the guilty are condemned to
death, the brutal drama which accompanies an execution might
conceivably be justifiable. But as Professor Edwin M. Borchard
has shown in his collection of case studies in mistaken identity,
the courts, however careful they may be, very often convict in-
nocent men.30 Not only is it difficult to obtain reliable testimony
in a murder trial but the very nature of the event causes far-
reaching psychological repercussions throughout society. From
the moment a crime is first announced in the newspapers the
civil authorities are deluged with false information from mentally
unstable individuals. As the trial reaches its climax various
persons emerge from the anonymity of the public to claim a
part in the drama. "In our own time, we have been treated
often to the fantastic spectacle of the innocent voluntarily con-
fessing to murder, putting their own lives in jeopardy for a
moment in the spotlight."3' Worse than this, there is reason to
believe that the wide publicity a murder trial receives leads to
imitative crime. This may well explain why murders follow one
another in rapid succession at certain times, whereas at other
times there is very little violence within society.2
It is shocking to realize that the "only" persons who are
actually made to suffer the death penalty in this country are
"unfortunates without friends or money."33 In theory the Ameri-
can system of criminal law does not distinguish between persons
or show favoritism toward any group or class. In actual prac-
tice, however, the law is brought to bear most heavily, and often
30 Borchard, Convicting the Innocent (1932).
31 Cook, op. cit. supra note 7, at 196.
32 Calvert, op. cit. supra note 14, at 112.
33 "Britain Faces End of Death Penalty," 73 Christian Cent. 259 (1956).
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with vengeance, on a very small percentage of the population.
In every society known to history there have always been one or
more minority groups that have been held suspect by the ma-
jority. In America it is the foreign born, and particularly the
Negroes, who are considered strange and different and are thus
largely treated as outsiders. Recognizing very little kinship or
common ideals with these minority groups, we seem to derive
sadistic pleasure from punishing individual persons from them
who come into conflict with the law."3 4
An analysis of national criminal statistics reveals that 50 per
cent more Negroes are actually executed in this country than
are Whites. 5 While this might seem to imply that Negroes are
basically more violent in temperament or nature than are Whites,
the facts do not bear out this conclusion. In the state of Vir-
ginia, as an example, no white man has been convicted of rape
in the past 50 years. Yet in this same period 59 Negroes have
been executed on conviction of this crime.36 Obviously the law
has been brought to bear more heavily on Negroes than Whites.
In the light of such social injustice, the retention of capital
punishment as an official policy of the state has become a matter
of great concern to many thinking Americans. Among those
who are disturbed by the idea of continuing to employ the death
penalty as a social expedient is the sensitive Christian who feels
that "society is itself indelibly corrupted when it assumes the
prerogative of God and attempts to impose or even threatens
to impose on anybody, whether guilty or innocent, the final and
irreversible judgement of death." 7 In the mind of this type of
religious person capital punishment not only rules out the possi-
bility that the individual criminal might be reformed by society
but asserts in absolute terms that he is also completely beyond
the redemptive power of God. This, of course, is an assumption
which no thoughtful Christian consciously cares to make.
On the secular plane, many persons are opposed to the re-
tention of capital punishment on the grounds that it makes even
greater the wide discrepancy which exists between democratic
34 Austin L. Poterfield, "The 'We-They' Fallacy in Thinking About Delin-
quents and Criminals," 21 Fed. Prob. 46 (1957).
35 Frank E. Hartung, 'Trends in the Use of Capital Punishment," 284 Annals
15 (1952).
36 Id. at 16.
37"The Death Penalty Must Go," 74 Christian Cent. 418 (1957).
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theory and practice in the United States. One of the most widely
accepted principles of liberal-democracy is a sincere respect for
the rights of the individual. While the right to life can in no
sense be defended as absolute, democracy insists that the indi-
vidual should never be deprived of his life without good cause
determined through due process of law. The deep reverence
for human life which is fundamental to the theory of democracy
is reflected in the fact that the movement toward the abolition
of capital punishment has made its greatest advances in those
countries which have adopted democratic forms of government.
Of the western democracies, only Britain, France, and the United
States will condone the death penalty, and Britain is making
rapid strides in the direction of abolition.
It is not by accident that democratic nations have generally
veered away from the use of capital punishment, whereas totali-
tarian governments have found it compatible with their goals
and have thus encouraged its use. In counter-distinction to
totalitarianism, there is general agreement among the theorists
of democracy that the state is not an end in itself but is merely
the means by which the good of the individual is to be furthered.
This means, of course, that a democracy must be extremely
cautious in what it decides when its government engages in
the formulation of policy in regard to the taking of human life.
Democratic governments in practice have often sanctioned the
taking of life when it was thought essential to the maintenance
of the general welfare, as in time of war and in the preservation
of domestic tranquillity. But ultimately they must defend their
actions in terms of what is just and fair rather than what is most
expeditious. As Machiavelli so clearly saw, the most difficult
problems of statecraft are easily solved when those who exercise
political power are guided by no consideration other than that
of expediency. In any democracy worthy of the name, how-
ever, the easy solutions Machiavelli urged upon his prince are
not easily adopted. This goes a long way toward explaining why
the death penalty in the United States is so seldom carried out.
Even if it might conceivably be proven a highly efficacious
deterrent to murder, we are still compelled to justify its use in
terms of our fundamental ideals and values. And here we find
that the theory of capital punishment is hopelessly out of keep-
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ing with the basic principles we as a nation profess to believe
in, for in taking the life of the criminal we are actually treating
him as a means to the good of others rather than as an end
in himself. 8
Totalitarianism, on the other hand, which has generally been
judged guilty of retarding the advance of human standards of
decency, has not been troubled with any such moral scruples.
Extending the use of capital punishment to political crimes,
totalitarian governments justify their actions on the argument
that anything is right if it furthers the good of the whole society.
This is evident in the statement by Mussolini that "the state is
an absolute before which individuals and groups are relative."39
Convinced that the end of the state is more important in value
than the rights of the individual, the elimination of recalcitrant
and politically unstable individuals has become an accepted
means to the greater glory of every totalitarian regime we have
witnessed thus far. In retaining capital punishment for its sup-
posed qualities as a social expedient, American democracy comes
dangerously close to accepting the totalitarian precept that the
life of the individual has little real significance compared with
the superior interest of the whole society.
IV
Any real progress we are apt to make in reducing the inci-
dence of crime within American society must come about through
efforts to revise our basic outlook toward crime and the criminal.
We must come to realize in this regard that the idea that crime,
including murder, is something the individual freely and wil-
fully chooses to engage in is a theological doctrine and is not
a logically defensible proposition. 40 This attitude is based on
the highly dubious supposition that some individuals are born
with defective moral characters and are therefore destined to do
the evil rather than the good. While we may have no quarrel
with this idea when it is presented as a theological statement,
we must totally reject it when it is introduced as a possible guide
for our actions in social and political matters. Not only is the
3 8 Viscount Ridley, "Should Crime be Controlled by Fear or Understand-
ing?", 18 Fed. Prob. 19 (1954).
39 See The Doctrine of Fascism (1932).
40 See Kosetler, op. cit. supra note 12, at 93-94.
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self-righteous indignation which characterizes this attitude to-
ward the criminal morally offensive when it is advanced as a
practical solution to the problem of crime but it so completely
distorts our social vision that we are unable to formulate any
intelligent policy in the all-important area of human relations.
There is considerable evidence to suggest that a life of crime
is never actually chosen by any individual but is a fate that has
been arbitrarily assigned to him by his society. So far as good
and evil are concerned, the average individual at birth is en-
tirely neutral. Some few people, of course, are born with defec-
tive mentalities and are therefore practically destined to come
into conflict with the law at one point or another in their lives
if the circumstances of their environment also tend to lead in
this direction. But this type of person belongs in a mental insti-
tution where he might be kept out of serious trouble if not
rehabilitated for a normal life within society. The average m-
dividual, if provided with a fairly adequate environment, in-
variably attempts to attain the goals and personal satisfactions
his society has taught him to value. It clearly follows from
this that any large scale deviation from the socially accepted
norm of behvaior, such as the "crime wave" this country is ex-
periencing at the present time, is symptomatic of serious de-
ficiencies in the institutional and value arrangement of society.4
Plato in his Republic makes mention of two different social types
that have since the earliest times been a problem to government.
The "ordinary drone," according to him, is the socially deprived
person who has become lazy and indifferent as a result of his
life of poverty but is otherwise harmless. The "drone that stings,"
on the other hand, is that deprived individual who has been made
bitter by the thought of the social injustices he feels he has suf-
fered and consequently becomes a threat to the stability of
the social order. It is to Plato's credit that he clearly distinguishes
between these two types. The first of these two classes of per-
sons is comparable to the modern lower income group, while the
second is what we generally refer to as our "criminal element."
There are two alternatives we may choose from in attacking the
problem these classes present to government. The state, to con-
tinue the metaphor begun by Plato, might instigate a program
41 For a very illuminating discussion of this problem, see Herbert Read,
Anarchy and Order: Essays in Politics (1954).
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of pest control designed to rid society of its drones that sting.
But this has the unfortunate result of indirectly goading the
ordinary drones to pick up the weapons of their fallen com-
rades in misfortune and to join the ranks of the harmful pests. The
other method, although the more difficult one, is for the state
to directly attack the problems of poverty and social injustice,
thereby eliminating the basic cause of criminal activity. All
efforts to reduce the level of crime within society are bound to
fail until we realize that the reform of the criminal is inseparably
connected with the general reform of our social and economic
institutions.42
Fundamental social and economic reforms, of course, are not
accomplished overnight, nor are they ever complete. Yet we
must not allow this fact to lead us to adopt an attitude of hope-
less pessimism regarding crime and the criminal. If we can bring
ourselves to clearly understand that the criminal is the product
of inadequate social and economic arrangements within society,
we will be capable of creating ideals against which existing
arrangements can be judged. A society that can create ideals
for itself is a dynamic society capable of accomplishing almost
anything it sets out to do. This is the only intelligent approach
to the problem of crime. It is a terribly difficult goal to set for
ourselves. Yet we must recognize the fact that if we fail to
solve our basic social problems, we must fall back on the "easy
way out," which consists of the futile method of attempting to
repress crime through the vicious expedient of capital punish-
ment.
43
The first step we must take in an attempt to revise our per-
spective toward murder is to bring ourselves to clearly realize
that murder is not a wholly natural act of man but one which is
greatly conditioned by the mores of society. One of the most
pronounced attitudes that characterizes American society at the
present time is the general assumption that "wherever there is
a conflict between human relations and necessity, the outcome
is not only inevitable but even progressive when necessity
wins.... -"" This idea is clearly reflected in our attitude toward
42 Richard B. Gregg, The Power of Non-Violence 165 (1934).
4 3 Rusche & Kirchheimer, Punishment and Social Structure 207 (1939).44 Arthur Miller, "The Shadows of the Gods," 217 Harper's Magazine 39
(1958).
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the convicted murderer. It is necessary for our peace of mind
and public safety that we remove such individuals from our
midst. This we do by locking them up in penitentiaries or, more
rarely, by carrying out the threatened death penalty. But in
either case we have clearly announced that public necessity is
more important than the intrinsic value of the human beings
concerned. This fact has not gone unnoticed by those who are
responsible for catering to the public's entertainment desires.
As a consequence, the American youth of today is raised on an
enriched pap of horror and suspense. His heroes are fast-shooting
cowboys, cagey detectives, and toughened combat veterans.
While it may be true that he instinctively knows the difference
between the "good guys" and the "bad guys," a steady enter-
tainment diet of violence and bloodshed is bound to impress
upon his mind the thought that life is cheap. How could he
believe otherwise when he knows full well that the society of
which he is a part "almost reaches out to encourage murder."45
It would be strange indeed, in the light of the present cultural
situation in America, if today's youth took seriously the religious
injunction that life is sacred.
We cannot look forward to a reduction in the rate of homi-
cide in this country until we undertake the extremely difficult
task of revising our basic attitudes and values concerning the
worth and significance of human life.46 While the problem of
changing fundamental attitudes of this kind is not one that is
given to easy solutions, neither is it insoluble. Much study must
be applied to this question before we can find a way out of our
predicament. There are, however, two practical and immediate
steps we might take that are almost certain to result in a sharp
decline in the rate of homicide within the United States. First,
laws pertaining to the sale and possession of guns must be tight-
ened and more closely supervised, for "it is a well-known fact
that stringent regulations . . . governing the possession of fire-
arms will reduce the number of murders."47 It is not enough,
however, that this program be carried out by the civil authori-
ties alone. No progress in this direction can be made so long as
Americans continue to think of the privilege of owning firearms
45 Ralph S. Banay, "Study in Murder," 284 Annals 26 (1952).
46 H. C. Brearley, Homicide in the United States 142 (1932).
47 Calvert, op. cit. supra note 14, at 164.
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as a natural right that cannot be interfered with for any purpose.
Public opinion must be educated to adopt the attitude that fire-
arms are not playthings but extremely dangerous implements
of violence. Secondly, Kentucky, along with the other states that
still retain capital punishment, must immediately abolish it.
This will have the effect of raising the respect felt for the sanc-
tity of human life in the minds of all Americans. It is not in
the least unrealistic to predict that if capital punishment were
abolished, the rate of homicide in this state would immediately
drop. Let us hope that Kentucky is not the last state to give up
the death penalty as it was the last to abandon the practice of
public executions.
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